Behind the Curtain: How Russia was able to Successfully Remove an American-Requested INTERPOL Red Notice

Yvevgeniy Prigozhin is probably most well-known for his role as head of the Wagner group, a shadowy military force answering to Vladamir Putin and operating throughout the world, including Ukraine and Africa.  Before the plane he was travelling in exploded mid-air, he and his Wagner minions marched towards Moscow in what appeared to be a possible coup attempt against Putin in mid-June, 2023.  But before all that, Prigozhin headed up Putin’s attempts to interfere in the 2016 Presidential election through his ownership and direction of the Internet Research Agency (IRA) which leads us to this interesting case. Prigozhin was indicted by the District of Columbia grand jury for a number of offenses relating to that attempted election interference.  Afterwards, the United States sought to secure his extradition to the USA by asking Interpol to issue a Red Notice.  It did so.

But what is interesting about this case is that Interpol ultimately removed that Red Notice. I think this is an interesting case to explore just how Interpol and its Red Notice system works and which highlights both its strengths and weaknesses. Helpfully, Interpol has a database of opinions to which it has granted public access and is where this following information comes from. 

At some point (it’s unclear when), Prigozhin became aware there may be an Interpol-issued Red Notice filed seeking his arrest and extradition to the United States.  In July 2019, Prigozhin submitted a request to access his file (if one existed) at Interpol.  The Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files (or CFF) approved the request and informed him a Red Notice had been requested and issued on behalf of the US National Central Bureau (By the way, not all Red Notices are published on Interpol’s website so it’s often necessary to make a specific request to determine if one exists). Prigozhin then lodged an official complaint with CCF in November 2019 to have the notice removed.  In February 2020, Prigozhin was provided a summary of the Red Notice which alleged he conspired with others to interfere in United States’ elections from 2014 to 2018.  While they studied his case, CCF blocked access to any additional data related to Prigozhin which he also objected to since the allegations against him were public. The basis of Prigozhin’s request to remove the notice was that the case against him was predominantly political in nature, citing the involvement of U.S. intelligence agencies and the Senate Intelligence Committee.  He further argued that U.S. sanctions that were issued against him were a political pressure tactic and not based on any legal process.   Prigozhin also argued the language of the federal statute was too vague and he cited to the Mueller report and the Congressional investigation as further evidence the case against him was political.  He argued the U.S. military’s cyber-attack against the IRA further demonstrated that the U.S. considers him an enemy.

Importantly, in granting Prigozhin’s request to remove the Red Notice, the CFF found the allegation against him was “an election crime” and therefore put it in tension with Article 3 of Interpol’s Constitution which prevents it from getting involved in political affairs.  CFF ultimately found that the political context of the charges against Prigozhin could have “significant adverse implications” for the organization as it could be perceived as siding with one country over another country.  The CCF concluded “the predominant political dimension” of the case militated in favor of removing the notice. 

So, first of all—when reviewing a CFF decision, it’s important to realize the document is highly redacted.  There were a number of paragraphs that were completely redacted that related to the Interpol Secretariat General’s independent investigation as well as matters provided to it by both the Russians and the United States regarding the matter.  That’s important because when assessing the propriety of Interpol’s decision, we really only see what Interpol allows us to see.  And here, Interpol appears to have clearly applied its governing principle that it not be used as a political tool of oppression.  But yet, that it one of the most common charges alleged against it, especially by Russia who has often used the Red Notice system as a way of repatriating political dissidents. I think this particular opinion illustrates some of the strengths and weaknesses of the Interpol system. A particular strength is its openness to review its decisions to issue a Red Notice, and it has a well-documented system for doing so.  But a weakness, at least in some situations, is its willingness to remove those notices, even if the person has committed clearly criminal acts, when those acts can be construed as “political.” On balance, though, Interpol appears clearly committed to assisting efforts of countries to repatriate criminals who have fled their jurisdictions to escape accountability. 

Reviewing decisions of the CFF provides an interesting look into how our country is regarded internationally as it relates to criminal justice matters. And it’s hard to escape the conclusion here that Interpol concluded we engaged in an improper use of its system, at least as it relates to this now-deceased, but once highly capable master misinformation actor and mercenary.